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Abstract
Does recent immigrant lineage influence the legislative behavior of members of Congress
on immigration policy? We examine the relationship between the immigrant background of
legislators (i.e., their generational distance from immigration) and legislative behavior, focus-
ing on roll-call votes for landmark immigration legislation and congressional speech on the
floor. Legislators more proximate to the immigrant experience tend to support more permissive
immigration legislation. Legislators with recent immigration backgrounds also speak more
often about immigration in Congress, though the size of immigrant constituencies in their
districts accounts for a larger share of this effect. A regression discontinuity design on close
elections, which addresses selection bias concerns and holds district composition constant,
confirms that legislators with recent immigrant backgrounds tend to support pro-immigration
legislation. Finally, we demonstrate how a common immigrant identity can break down along
narrower ethnic lines in cases where restrictive legislation targets specific places of origin. Our
findings illustrate the important role of immigrant identity in legislative behavior and help il-
luminate the legislative dynamics of present-day immigration policy.
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Introduction
Descriptive representation hinges on identity. When “representatives are [...] typical of the larger
class of persons whom they represent” (Mansbridge, 1999), this shared identity can help dictate
how constituents evaluate their representatives (Gay, 2002), how representatives respond to con-
stituents (Butler and Broockman, 2011), and how constituent preferences are translated into policy
(Bratton and Ray, 2002). While scholars have both critiqued and extolled descriptive representa-
tion as it pertains to observable or self-identified characteristics, such as gender or race (Swers,
1998; Swain, 1995; Washington, 2012), evaluating other characteristics proves more challenging.
This is particularly true for immigrant identity.
Over 99% of the population of the United States today is descended from immigrants or en-
slaved people of African origin.1 Many Americans have their own personal or family story of
immigration, and members of Congress (MCs) often cite their own familial immigration history
when discussing immigration policy (Swarns, 2006; Burden, 2007, p.18). And yet, a common
immigrant identity that submerges intragroup boundaries does not always extend to the realm
of immigration policy, where support for restrictive immigration legislation was commonplace
throughout the 20th and 21st centuries in Congress (Tichenor, 2002), and aggregate public opin-
ion often aligned with these policies or supported even more extreme restrictions (Hainmueller
and Hopkins, 2014).
At the same time, scholars have characterized the immigrant experience as a central com-
ponent of American national identity, drawing on it in developing concepts such as “incorpora-
tionism” or “cultural pluralism” (Schildkraut, 2014; Kallen, 1924). In research describing conversa-
tions about political representation, the notion of an overarching, common “identity as immigrants
emerges [. . . ] strongly and consistently” for people from a variety of immigrant backgrounds
(Schildkraut, 2013). Ultimately, it is still an open question whether elected representatives who
have immigrated from different source countries and differ in religion, class and culture would
form a coherent group or have aligned preferences on important policy issues.
1The 2017 American Community Survey reported a population of 3.2 million Native Americans, Alaskan Natives,
and Native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates.
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This paper studies the familial histories of members of the U.S. Congress to address several
key questions about representation and immigrant background. For whom and under what con-
ditions is an immigrant identity salient? When does it prompt legislators to hold systematically
different views on immigration policy? Does electing a legislator with an immigrant background
enhance representation of immigrant groups? Does having foreign-born parents or grandparents
contribute to an overarching, common immigrant identity or instead do narrower categories such
as country of origin or ethnicity better explain legislative behavior?
To answer these questions, we analyze the role of immigrant background and family history
on two canonical forms of legislative behavior for MCs: legislative voting and speeches on the
floor of Congress. Because immigrant identity is complex and hard to infer, we use historical cen-
sus data from 1900–1940 to directly observe the family backgrounds of lawmakers in the 64th–91st
Congresses. Our sample period includes two of the most consequential changes to American im-
migration policy: the closing of the border in the 1920s and the reshaping of immigration in 1965
by the Immigration and Nationality Act. Linking to the census allows us to examine the coun-
tries of origin of the lawmakers themselves, their parents, and, in many cases, their grandparents.
While a relatively low share of MCs are immigrants themselves (see Figure 1), a significant number
have foreign-born parents or grandparents.2 For example, in the 115th Congress, only 11 repre-
sentatives (2.5%) and one senator were immigrants. However, 11.8% of representatives and 14.6%
of senators had at least one foreign-born parent.3In the first half of the 20th century, the share of
representatives with a foreign-born parent reached as high as 30 percent of the chamber.
We develop hypotheses about immigrant background and descriptive representation based
on a simple model of legislative decision-making: MCs weigh some combination of their per-
sonal views along with the preferences of their geographic constituency, reelection or support
constituency, and national party (Fenno, 1978; Levitt, 1996). A background characteristic such as
familial immigration history is relevant because it may shape MCs’ policy views. The legislative
2See Lawson (1957) for a statistical summary of foreign-born MCs though 1949. Our numbers differ slightly, due to
our efforts to exclude MCs who were born abroad to American parents.
3We identified country of origin for the parents of 98% of the MCs in the 115th Congress. We cross-referenced our
numbers for the 115th Congress with Geiger (2019) and found agreement on the vast majority of cases with a few minor
discrepancies.
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Figure 1: Foreign-Born MCs Over Time. The gray box highlights the main period of our analysis.
behavior that we observe reveals information about this process — particularly, when and for
what outcomes immigrant background matters most. The degree to which differences in immi-
grant background translate into measurable differences in legislative behavior should depend on
factors that interact with family history to shape MCs’ views, including the political context, the
visibility of the MC’s identity, and constituent demands for a “descriptive representative” with an
immigrant background (Mansbridge, 1999).
We hypothesize that less distance from the immigrant experience increases the probability that
lawmakers view themselves as representatives of immigrant communities; in turn, this perspec-
tive leads lawmakers to hold more permissive views on immigration policy and to allot more
attention to immigrant constituencies and immigration policy in general — even when holding
constant the composition of the lawmakers’ constituency. We also hypothesize that characteristics
visibly identifying a lawmaker with an immigrant community complement this alignment of de-
scriptive with substantive representation. Thus, a surname indicating a more recent immigration
history will increase the probability of a lawmaker representing the interests of immigrant groups,
independent of actual immigration history.
We find that MCs with family histories of immigration (1) cast pro-immigration votes —
against restrictive bills or in favor of expanding immigration — at higher rates; and, (2) give
more floor speeches about immigration. We observe decreasing effect sizes as one’s generational
distance from the immigrant experience increases. When controlling for the composition of an
MC’s district (i.e., foreign-born population), the effect of immigration history on roll-call voting
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persists and MCs appear to weight each factor equally; for immigration-related speech, however,
district composition explains a greater share of variation than does immigrant background. This
difference in results might suggest that any MC may be willing to engage in some forms of po-
sition taking on immigration but only those with an immigrant background will take on costly
actions such as breaking with their party on a crucial roll-call vote. Second, we use a regression
discontinuity design to estimate the effects of electing an MC with a family immigration history on
voting on immigration bills. This approach avoids concerns over why some districts elect repre-
sentatives with (or without) immigrant family histories and holds constant the MC’s geographic
constituency. These results confirm our main finding, suggesting that districts quasi-randomly
assigned MCs with family histories of immigration voted in favor of expansive immigration poli-
cies at higher rates. All together, these findings illustrate that electing legislators with foreign-born
parents or grandparents has more than just symbolic consequences for representation: these MCs
not only give voice to the issue of immigration policy, but also stake out more permissive policy
positions overall — positions broadly in line with the tendency of citizens who are foreign born
or who have foreign-born parents to support such permissive policies (Schildkraut, 2013).
Next, we study the conditions under which lawmakers tend to place greater weight on immi-
grant background when making immigration policy decisions. MCs with surnames denoting an
immigrant background (based on census records) support more permissive immigration policy,
holding actual immigrant background constant. We observe significant differences in the impor-
tance of different family members on a lawmaker’s behavior: for MCs in our sample (almost
exclusively male), the origins of their father’s father has larger effects than those of other grand-
parents. We also observe how levels of support for permissive immigration policy can break down
along narrower lines of ethnic identity. When faced with legislation restricting immigration based
on national origin, MCs with an immigrant background but from nations unaffected by the re-
strictions supported restrictive policies at a higher rate than their colleagues with family origins
in targeted countries. Thus, while MCs with family histories of immigration share a common ten-
dency towards permissive immigration policy, under some conditions it can be subsumed by a
preference for a narrower group identity based on national origin.
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Finally, we show that mechanisms similar to those we identify in this historical data (1) persist
in present-day politics, and (2) accord with the polarized state of current immigration politics.
Evaluating the relationship between familial immigration history and recent immigration votes
(while controlling for political party), MCs who are the children and grandchildren of immigrants
still tend to oppose restrictive legislation. The explanatory power of political party for positions
taken on immigration has increased greatly over time (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017), but immigrant
identity continues to also play a critical role. We also document sharp declines in the number of
Republicans with recent immigrant family histories; given the relationship (both historical and
contemporary) between family history and views on immigration, this shift in the composition of
the parties reflects the differences in immigration policy stances across parties in the contemporary
Congress.
The relationship between race and immigrant identity also marks a complex point of com-
parison between our period of study and today’s Congress. Most of the immigrant MCs in our
historical sample are white, echoing both the history of race in American politics and the fact that
immigration to the US from most non-European countries was nearly impossible for the late 19th
and early 20th centuries.4 But as scholars (for example, Painter (2011) and Roediger (2006)) have
documented extensively, the concept of race and whiteness in the early 20th century was con-
tested.5 American society, and lawmakers, did not always view European immigrants, especially
those from southern and eastern Europe, as belonging to the same racial group as “white” Amer-
icans (Guglielmo, 2003). Thus, while the analysis of historical legislative behavior in our study
may not speak directly to the racial dynamics at play in today’s immigration debates, ideas about
race still had bearing on the immigration policies applied to European immigrants in the early
and mid 20th Century.
This paper’s findings add to and extend a robust literature on descriptive representation and
its effects on legislative activity and policy. For example, Swers (1998) finds that women MCs vote
4The shares from Europe were over 80% from 1850 to 1950, with immigrants from Canada making up another
substantial share (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). Immigration to the US from Asia was banned entirely for much of
the period.
5So too in Congress. See Tichenor (2002) for detailed accounts of how Congress relied on racial tropes and discred-
ited pseudo-science from groups such as the Immigration Restriction League when formulating immigration policy.
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differently than men on women’s issues, controlling for other major factors including party and
ideology. On race, Baker and Cook (2005) find that black MCs better represent the interests of black
constituents than do white MCs, even when there is not an electoral benefit. Preuhs and Hero
(2011) find that minority lawmakers employ different cues when making decisions, providing
different representation than whites when politics have a racial dimension. Overall, these works
suggest that MCs who are political minorities represent their constituencies differently — a finding
echoed by our results on the effects of immigrant background.
Our key contribution, and a departure from most literature in this area, is to add unprece-
dented breadth and depth to these accounts of descriptive representation by unbundling immi-
grant background into component parts. We let group boundaries vary in our assessment of im-
migrant history: considering its temporal aspects (generational distance), visibility (surname),
composition (which ancestors matter), as well as subregional identities (and when these are/are
not salient). Our approach recognizes and tries to account for critiques such as the one made by
Sen and Wasow (2016) — who highlight the difficulties in making causal inferences about funda-
mentally immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity and gender — by including analyses
at the district level where variation occurs at the level of candidates (with or without immigrant
backgrounds) in close elections.
Our paper connects with research on individual legislator backgrounds and characteristics. A
substantial literature suggests that demographics, personal characteristics, experience and ideol-
ogy are important factors in political decision making and help explain differences in vote choice
between legislators with similar measures of political ideology. Burden (2007) argues that the
backgrounds and experiences of legislators play an important role in their vote choices. Law-
maker race (Canon, 1999), gender (Fridkin and Kenney, 2014), economic class (Carnes, 2013), and
children’s gender (Washington, 2009) all play significant roles in legislator vote choice and behav-
ior.
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Immigration Legislation and Speech
Since the First Congress, legislators have grappled with immigration and citizenship policies.
The Naturalization Act of 1790 marked the first comprehensive immigration policy set forth by
Congress and, as did later acts of Congress, balanced naturalization of some citizens — free Whites
who met certain residence and character requirements — with exclusion of others — American In-
dians and enslaved peoples to name but a few. In the two centuries since, immigration policy has
not moved linearly towards more openness. Rather, U.S. immigration policy can be characterized
as a sequence of restrictive and expansive policy regimes, responding to changes in the political
environment over time (Tichenor, 2002). See Appendix Section A.1.1 for discussion of the history
of U.S. immigration policy.
To assess legislative behavior related to immigration policy, we identified key immigration
bills in the 1915–1971 period (the 64th through 91st Congresses) using Stathis’ (2014) compilation
of landmark legislation and key bills identified by Tichenor (2002). We selected this time period
for two reasons: (1) this period spans most major immigration bills of the 20th century; and, (2)
members serving in this period were likely to be identifiable in the 1900–1940 censuses. We then
identified the final roll-call vote in each chamber for each bill — either the vote on final passage
or on the conference vote — using the VoteView database (Lewis et al., 2017). Several bills were
dropped because final votes on the bill were not recorded and, in a handful of cases, the final
vote occurred to override a presidential veto.6 Appendix Table A1 lists the eight bills that we
included in our analysis, and Appendix Section A.1.2 describes the legislation in detail. These
bills represented major changes to U.S. immigration policy during the mid-20th century. Five of
the bills restricted immigration, and three increased immigration or reduced restrictions.
Our second primary outcome is congressional speech for the 64th–91st Congresses. To mea-
sure speech on immigration, we drew upon speeches recorded in the Congressional Record and
assembled in Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2019). These authors also construct keywords to
identify speeches on 22 substantive topics, including immigration. We use these topics and also
6Veto override votes occurred for the Immigration Act of 1917, the McCarran Internal Security Act and the
McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act.
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construct an additional topic that we term “family” so that we can observe instances when MCs
speak about immigration and family concurrently.7 Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2019) report
the full details on the processing and construction of the congressional speech data.
Identifying Immigration Background
To estimate the effects of family immigration background on MC vote choice, we use individual-
level data from the 1900 through 1940 U.S. Censuses. We begin by constructing a new linked
sample, locating MCs in the 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 Federal censuses, based on the Inte-
grated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) complete count censuses (Ruggles et al., 2010).
To start, we identify all MCs, serving between 1915 and 1971 (the 64th through 91st Con-
gresses). To link these MCs back to the census, we extract their full names, dates of birth, and
states of birth from the Biographical Directory of the United Stated Congress. For members who were
born abroad (and are consequently very difficult to match to census records), we search for their
family backgrounds manually and record the citizenship status of their parents (and grandparents
when possible) directly. Members born abroad to at least one U.S. citizen parent are not considered
immigrants, as they are citizens from birth.
Our choice of sample is driven partially by data constraints — which MCs are in the right
cohorts to link to the available complete count censuses — but we also cover a period well-suited
to study how immigrant background might affect political representation. During the Age of
Mass Migration, the ancestral stock of the US changed dramatically and Congress considered a
number of severe immigration restrictions in the 1910s and 1920s, as well as in the mid-century
when concerns about Communism led to a a reshaping of the nation’s immigration policy.
Census questions vary slightly year to year, but they nonetheless provide a wealth of infor-
mation for each person we can link.8 For studying family immigration history, we focus on two
questions asked. First, all people enumerated in 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 were asked their place
of birth and their mother’s and father’s places of birth.9 Because members of the same households
7Keywords to identify speech about immigration and family are listed in Appendix A.2.4.
8See Appendix Section A.2.2 for more information.
9In 1940, the mother’s and father’s places of birth question was only a sample line question, asked only of 2 people
on each 40 person census page.
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are linked in the enumeration, when we observe MCs as children, we can also observe the place
of birth of all their grandparents, using their mothers’ and fathers’ answers to their own parents’
places of birth question.
We link all members to their census records in 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, or 1940 with the linking
method described in Feigenbaum (2016, 2018).10 Linking historical records is complicated by the
lack of a unique identifier. Instead, we rely on variables like name, place of birth, and date of birth,
which should not change over time.11 Still, noise in our data makes exact matching — requiring an
MC to report his or her first and last name, year of birth, and state of birth exactly the same in the
census as in our congressional data — impractical and potentially biased. Hand linking records
is likely the method most able to distinguish between subtle errors in two records identifying the
same person or distinguishing two different people. But it is not practical to apply hand linking to
large samples and — even with clear instructions on how to make links — not replicable. Instead,
we apply a machine learning approach, training an algorithm to learn to make matches based on
a smaller sample of carefully linked data. The algorithm learns from the human how to trade
off errors in first names or last names or how large a penalty to apply to potential matches with
one or two years off in the year of birth. A priori, the costs of such errors are unknown, so the
approach makes the implicit rules used by a human linker explicit. The algorithm makes use of
a wide range of record linkage features to build predictions for matches including Jaro-Winkler
string distance in first and last name, absolute difference in year of birth, Soundex agreement on
first and last name, agreement on first and last characters of first and last names, as well as name
commonness and state of birth.
Overall, we link 94.1% of the MCs in our study sample to at least one of the five decennial
censuses. Our match rates into each of the five censuses are all above 57%, peaking at 68.7%
matching into the 1910 census, when we limit to MCs born as of the census year.12 The true
positive rate is 92% in cross-validation: this suggests that the linking algorithm is very efficient,
10See Appendix Section A.2.2 for discussion of the merits of this and other census-linking approaches.
11Our use of last names in the linking complicates matching women who might be expected — particularly in the
early 20th century — to change names upon marriage. However, during this time period, very few women served in
Congress. Only 2% of the MCs in our sample were women.
12Consistent with the machine learning procedure, these match rates also replicate the match rates of our human
trainer in each census.
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able to identify nearly all of the matches that a human trainer would have made, but doing so
at scale and with clearly defined linking rules. In addition, our cross-validation implies that the
linking algorithm makes the same choice as a careful and well-trained hand linker more than 86%
of the time, as our precision or positive predictive value is 86.3%.13
We present three examples of MCs from the linked data in Table 1. Former Speaker of the
House Carl Albert was born in Oklahoma in 1908, to a mother from Texas and a father from
Missouri. All four of his grandparents were born in the United States as well. Clinton Anderson, a
former MC, Senator, and Secretary of Agriculture, was born in 1895 in South Dakota, to a mother
from South Dakota and a father who immigrated from Sweden. His maternal grandmother was
born in Illinois, while his maternal grandfather was a Swedish immigrant. Since his father was
an immigrant, we cannot find his paternal grandparents in the census data, but we assume they
were born in Sweden as well. Finally, former Speaker of the House Joseph Martin, Jr. was born
in Massachusetts in 1884 to Irish immigrant parents. We cannot find link to his grandparents
because his parents were immigrants, so we assume they were born in Ireland as well. These
examples highlight the demographic diversity contained in immigration backgrounds. While all
three are white men who served in Congress concurrently, their immigration backgrounds vary.
Table 1: Examples of Family Background from Census Data
Carl Albert Clinton Anderson Joseph Martin, Jr.
Birthplace Oklahoma South Dakota Massachusetts
Mother Texas South Dakota Ireland
Father Missouri Sweden Ireland
Maternal Missouri Illinois Ireland
Grandparents Kansas Sweden Ireland
Paternal Missouri Sweden Ireland
Grandparents Texas Sweden Ireland
We take several approaches to measuring immigration history, our key variable of interest. In
addition to measuring an MC’s own place of birth, we also examine the number of foreign-born
13Appendix Section A.2.1 provides an example describing linked MCs with varying family immigration histories.
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parents an MC has, ranging from 0 to 2. As Table 2 reports, the average MC in our sample had
0.38 parents born abroad. We also measure the number of foreign-born grandparents (ranging
from 0 to 4). On average, an MC in our sample had 1.7 foreign-born grandparents. By necessity,
any empirical analysis we run that includes foreign-born grandparents will have a smaller sample
because we could only successfully count nativity of grandparents when we observed an MC
residing in the home of his or her parents.14 This form of missingness occurs most frequently
in the early years of our sample, particularly among older MCs who were not living with their
parents during the 1900 or 1910 censuses. Looking across the sample of voting MCs as a whole, 15
percent of MCs had both parents foreign born and 34 percent of MCs had all grandparents foreign
born.
Perhaps surprisingly, we observe little difference in immigration histories across party in our
sample of votes. Table 2 shows that in the House slightly more Republicans than Democrats had
foreign-born parents and grandparents. The differences across party are equally small in the Sen-
ate. On the other hand, we do observe notable differences across region: Southern MCs from
both parties had by far the lowest rates of foreign-born parents and grandparents, and Democrats
from the Northeast exhibited greater numbers of foreign-born parents and grandparents than Re-
publicans from the Northeast. We have also checked whether over-time variation masks broader
differences in immigration histories between the parties. When examining the House on its own
there does appear to be some imbalance over time, with more Republican MCs having family his-
tories of immigration in the early years of our sample and the trend reversing in the later years of
our sample.
Overall, we have the measure of foreign-born grandparents for slightly under 60% of the sam-
ple of voting members, and we have the measure of foreign-born parents for 93% of voting mem-
bers.15 For those MCs without any missing data on parents or grandparents, we constructed an
“Immigration Index,” designed to summarize the immigration history of an MC with one number.
14This is because the nativity of grandparents is recovered from questions about mother and father’s place of birth
asked of the MCs mother and father. Also, if the nativity of one grandparent was missing, we made the assumption
that the missing grandparent had the same odds as the non-missing grandparents of being foreign born.
15Appendix Tables A8 and A9 display summary statistics for former MCs who cast key immigration votes and all
MCs, respectively. We include MCs who were foreign-born non-citizens but exclude MCs who were foreign born as
citizens.
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Table 2: Family Immigration History for MCs by Party and Chamber
Chamber Party N MC Parents
Grand-
parents
At Least
One Parent
At Least
One Grand-
parent
All
Parents
All
Grand-
parents
Both All 852 0.03 0.38 1.70 0.23 0.55 0.15 0.34
House Dem 234 0.03 0.39 1.51 0.23 0.48 0.16 0.30
House Rep 343 0.04 0.44 1.85 0.27 0.60 0.18 0.36
Senate Dem 149 0.01 0.27 1.59 0.17 0.51 0.10 0.32
Senate Rep 122 0.04 0.31 1.75 0.20 0.57 0.11 0.37
This index consists of a weighted average across place of own birth, parents’ birth and grandpar-
ents’ birth.16
We also make use of surnames as a proxy for family immigration history. To translate names
into quantitative variables, we take the 90 to 140 million people enumerated in each decennial
census and calculate — for each surname — the share foreign born, the mean number of foreign-
born parents, the mean number of foreign-born grandparents and the average Immigration Index.
We will refer to these surname-based measures of immigration history as Surname Scores. We
performed each surname calculation by census region (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, South and West)
since the same surname can denote meaningfully different immigration histories depending on
region of the country. We then matched an individual’s surname to the Surname Scores calculated
for the census preceding their election to Congress and the relevant region.17
Roll-Call Vote Analysis
We have hypothesized that personal immigration experiences influence roll-call votes for MCs. To
test this, we evaluate the relationship between an MC’s immigration history and vote choice on
several key 20th Century immigration votes. Specifically, we employ a model of the form
yib = α+ δ · Immigration Historyi + X · β+ γb + eib (1)
16Immigration Index = 1(MC Foreign Born) + 12 · (# Parents Foreign Born) + 14 · (# Grandparents Foreign Born),
and ranges from 0 (all grandparents, parents, and MC born in the United States) to 3 (MC foreign born).
17Appendix Section A.2.1 includes additional discussion on surname scores.
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where i indexes individual MCs and b indexes bills. X is a matrix of covariates including a measure
of foreign-born population in a state/district, indicators for chamber, party, region, age and tenure.
Our main specification pools across bills and therefore also includes γb, a bill fixed effect. Further,
this approach allows us to take subsamples of the data by bill, chamber and expected vote choice
to evaluate heterogeneity in the effects of immigration experience on vote choice.
For each of the bills listed in Table A1, we determined whether a “yea” or “nay” vote best
aligned with a political position generally favoring a less restrictive immigration policy.18 We
coded MCs who cast pro immigrant votes in this direction with a 1 and those who did not with a
0. We excluded MCs who abstained from voting from the sample.19
We find a strong relationship between immigration history — measured by foreign-born MCs,
number of foreign-born parents and number of foreign-born grandparents — and pro-immigration
votes, as we report in Table 3. We use Equation 1 to estimate the relationship between immigra-
tion history and vote choices on immigration policy across our range of congressional immigration
votes. Each model uses a different measure of family immigration status. Model 1 reports the ef-
fect of the MC being an immigrant (foreign born) themselves; model 3 reports effect of the MC
having a foreign both parent, model 5 reports the effect of the MC having a foreign-born grand-
parent, and model 7 uses our immigration index.
With no controls other than a bill fixed effect, we find that a foreign-born MC has a more than
25 percentage point higher rate of casting a pro vote; having one foreign-born parent is associ-
ated with a more than 16 percentage point increase; and having one foreign-born grandparent
is associated with a more than 8 percentage point increase. In each case, we can reject the null
hypothesis of no effect at standard levels of statistical significance (p < 0.01). The advantage of
such a sparse specification is that we do not have to worry about bias induced by controlling for
post-treatment variables. We next include a host of control variables known to be associated with
roll-call vote choice including foreign-born population, party, age, tenure and region. Including
controls for party and foreign-born population deserves particular attention. One concern that
18Yeas and Nays in the regression analyses include announced votes and paired votes.
19Especially in this era missed votes occurred frequently and were due more to travel and scheduling limitations
than strategic absences.
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arises is that an individual MC’s immigration history influences choice of party, and conditioning
on this choice induces bias. While we cannot discount that possibility entirely, we think the effect
of a marginal immigrant/non-immigrant grandparent likely does not strongly influence such a
choice given that we have shown that the parties have roughly even rates of parent and grand-
parent foreign birth. With regard to a state or district’s foreign-born population, one might worry
that districts with a large share of foreign born residents both select representatives with immi-
grant backgrounds and select representatives that vote for expansive immigration policies. As a
result, state or district composition might drive the positive correlations observed in Table 3. As
one attempt to check for this possibility, we determined the number of foreign born residents of
each MC’s constituency (congressional districts for the House and states for the Senate).20
Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table 3 present the results with covariates. We continue to find
a strong relationship between immigration history and pro-immigration votes. Controlling for
other factors, we find that MCs with one foreign-born parent cast pro-immigration votes at a rate 8
percentage points higher than those with none. Similarly, an additional foreign-born grandparent
increased pro-immigration voting rates by 3.1 percentage points. Importantly, these effect sizes
obtain even when controlling for political party and foreign-born population. Thus, we observe
these findings over and above whatever extent party identification determined one’s position on
immigration.
Across all models in Table 3, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of immigra-
tion experience on voting in favor of immigration in Congress. Furthermore, when we exclude
foreign born MCs from the sample, and re-estimate the effect (for native-born MCs) of having a
foreign-born parent or a foreign-born grandparent, we find essentially identical results to those
in Table 3. This suggests that, because the coefficients decline by roughly half with each preced-
ing generation’s immigration history, the effect of immigration background on voting is similar
for a foreign born MC, a US-born MC with two immigrant parents, and a US-born MC with four
immigrant grandparents.
Family history of immigration also helps us explain ideologically-surprising or “miscast” votes
20Foreign-born residents in a district correlates very highly with native-born residents who have foreign-born par-
ents. We include this covariate as a general proxy for constituencies with histories of immigration in the district.
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on immigration issues. Foreign-born parents or grandparents predict a reduced rate of diverging
from pre-existing ideology when an MC is predicted to vote in favor of immigration and an in-
creased rate of diverging when an MCs pre-existing ideology predicts a vote against permissive
immigration policy. Appendix Section A.3.1 reports the full results.
Overall, we interpret these findings to suggest that immigration history, even two generations
back, is highly predictive of pro-immigration vote choices; this pattern holds even when account-
ing for one’s party and underlying political ideology. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that
these findings do not hinge on the composition of the district electing MCs.21
To put these results in context, we compare the predictive power of immigrant family history
on vote choices to the predictive power for votes occurring in other policy areas. Specifically,
we classify all remaining bills in the same Congresses as our landmark immigration votes by
topic codings due to Peltzman (1984). These relatively broad topics include issues such as the
Budget, Defense, Indian Affairs and others. Then, following an approach outlined by Washington
(2009), we identified votes where the majority of one party favored legislation and the majority
of the opposing party did not (i.e., conflict existed over the vote) and coded these votes based
on whether an MC supported the ideologically left position when voting (again, based on which
party supported the legislation). As an additional check, we also chose two narrower topics that
we viewed as orthogonal to immigrant background (transportation and environment) and we
selected landmark votes in these areas using the same procedure as for the landmark immigration
votes (i.e., consulting Stathis (2014) to identify landmark legislation in an area and then identifying
the vote for final passage).
Figure 2 reports the share of votes for each topic where we found a statistically significant result
of foreign-born parents on MC vote choice, controlling for other factors. By chance, we should
expect 5 percent of individual votes to have a statistically significant relationship at p = 0.05
(demarcated by the dotted vertical line in the figure). As the figure makes apparent, immigration
legislation registers by far the greatest share of roll-call votes where an MC’s immigration history
mattered. While immigrant background and identity should matter for some other policy topics,
21Differential patterns of missing data also do not appear to explain the results. Section A.3.2 replicates Table 3 using
Surname Scores, which exist for all MCs.
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Figure 2: Effect of Foreign-Born Parents on Permissive/Liberal Vote for Placebo Topics (ML de-
notes Major Legislation)
if descriptive representation on immigration operates as we have proposed, then it should matter
most for legislation on immigration. Other policy topics where immigrant background appears to
have some explanatory power (controlling for other factors) include the Budget and Regulation
categories.
We also display the coefficients estimated for each major immigration vote by chamber. Ap-
pendix A.3.3 reports the bill by bill results in detail. When estimated individually, the sign on the
coefficients for immigrant parents and grandparents is in the right direction for each vote with the
exception of one vote in the Senate. Overall, the results appear stronger for individual bills in the
House as compared to the Senate.
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Overall, we have shown that an MC places considerable weight on his or her immigrant back-
ground when casting roll-call votes on immigration. To what extent does the tendency to draw
upon own immigrant background enhance representation of immigrant groups in the district?
First, previous research has suggested that people who are first or second generation immigrants
themselves express more permissive attitudes on immigration overall.22 So, legislator actions in
favor of permissive immigration policy accords with the views of immigrant groups in an MC’s
district more often than not. Second, we know that congressional districts with higher numbers
of foreign-born constituents tended to elect candidates with immigrant family histories. Figure 3
displays a binned scatter plot that shows the strong, positive relationship between foreign-born
population in a district and the Immigration Index for the MC elected. Table A10 in the Appendix
reports similar results from regressions that also control for the urban population in the district
and region. Congressional districts containing constituencies with immigrant populations system-
atically selected candidates with immigrant backgrounds at higher rates than districts without
these constituencies. Demand for descriptive representatives at the district level translated into
the selection of MCs with immigrant backgrounds to draw upon when deciding how to vote on
key immigration legislation; in turn, these MCs supported permissive legislation on immigration.
22See Mayda (2006), O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006), and Schildkraut (2013) as examples of this empirical regularity.
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Figure 3: Relationship between CD Foreign-Born Pop. and Immigration Index of Elected MCs
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Regression Discontinuity Analysis
In the previous section, we demonstrated the strong correlation between an MC’s immigration
background (in terms of own, parent, and grandparent place of birth as well as in terms of an
Immigration Index) and vote choices on immigration policy. One critique of this approach is
that immigration background might correlate strongly with unobserved variables, such as district
characteristics, that also correlate with vote choice. For instance, perhaps districts with a prefer-
ence for inclusive immigration policies elect candidates with immigrant backgrounds who favor
permissive immigration policies. District preferences rather than an MC’s personal immigration
background might still drive the observed votes for more permissive immigration policies.
As an additional check against such an issue, we use an approach that yields as good as ran-
dom variation in the immigration background of an elected official at the district level. Specifically,
we implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD) in which we compare the voting records
for officials from districts who narrowly elected a candidate with an immigrant background to
districts who narrowly did not elect a candidate with an immigrant background.
The approach we take here follows the standards for employing a regression discontinuity
design in an electoral setting (Lee, 2008). The key assumption hinges on the notion that winning a
very close election occurs largely due to random factors. As an election grows closer, a candidate’s
chance of landing narrowly on one side or the other of the 50% vote threshold, which determines
the winner, begins to resemble a coin flip. By comparing the gap in vote choices between winners
and losers at the 50% threshold we obtain an estimate of the effect of immigration background on
vote choice.
To implement this research design, we supplemented the data we gathered on MCs with ad-
ditional election data, including gathering the names and vote shares for individuals who ran for
office and lost.For House general elections, we identified the top two vote getters and determined
the vote shares for these top two candidates. We excluded House districts that were at-large for
states that had multiple congressional districts; often these districts attracted many candidates
from the same party and, in some instances, had multiple winners.
When determining the immigration backgrounds for losing election candidates, it was not
21
possible to match to census data because we lacked even the most basic information on losing
candidates’ ages and places of birth. Instead, for this regression discontinuity design, we impute
all candidates’ immigration histories based on Surname Scores. For the sake of consistency, we
use this surname-based approach for election winners as well.
While not a one to one correspondence, the correlation between actual immigration family his-
tory and surname score is very high. We view immigration history based on surname as measur-
ing the variable of interest, Immigration Historyi, but with some error — that is, Immigration Historyi =
Surname Scorei + ε i. The error term can be thought of as the difference for each individual be-
tween the average immigration background of someone with that surname and the actual immi-
gration background of the individual under study. Appendix Figure A1 illustrates the correspon-
dence between Immigration Historyi and Surname Scorei.
For each of our key immigration votes, we identify the electoral contest preceding the term in
which the vote was cast. In an experimental setting, we might flip a coin to determine the family
immigration history of the person casting a vote; in our case, we have instead identified close
elections where one candidate has a Surname Score that denotes an immigrant background and
where one candidate does not. Specifically, we coarsen the key measure of immigration history
into a binary variable that denotes whether or not a candidate is considered to have a family
history of immigration based on their surname.
To determine the threshold for whether an MC’s surname indicates a family history of immi-
gration or not, we examined the distribution of Surname Scores for each of our measures. De-
termining the threshold for a surname to denote a foreign-born candidate, or a candidate with
foreign-born parents or grandparents, is somewhat arbitrary. We chose a simple rule of thumb
and set the binary indicator for a family immigration history equal to one for MCs with a Surname
Score in the top third of the distribution for their region. We set the indicator to zero for MCs with
a Surname Score in the bottom third of the distribution for their region.23 This approach restricts
the sample to elections with one candidate with an immigrant background and one without such
231(Immigration Historyi) equals one when FSS(Surname Scorei) > 0.5 + x, where x = 0.17; and,
1(Immigration Historyi) equals zero when FSS(Surname Scorei) ≤ 0.5− x, where again x = 0.17. All observations
in (0.5− x, 0.5+ x] are excluded from the sample.
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a background based on these thresholds for the Surname Score. As a robustness check, we also
report results for all other possible thresholds: the specific cutoff chosen is not consequential for
our results.
For example, in the 1910 Census someone with the surname “SISKIND” residing in the north-
east averaged 3.98 foreign-born grandparents. This ranked in the top third of surnames in terms of
foreign-born grandparents. Conversely, someone with the surname “HALL,” which averaged 1.21
foreign-born grandparents in 1910, ranked in the bottom third of surnames in terms of foreign-
born grandparents.
We estimate an equation of the form
yi = α+ θ · 1(Immigration History Winneri) + f (Vi) + ei (2)
where 1(Immigration History Winneri) denotes that the winner of the election has a Surname
Score in the top third of the distribution for the relevant measure of immigration history (i.e.,
foreign born, foreign-born parents, foreign-born grandparents, or Immigration Index depending
on the specification). θ, the parameter of primary interest, provides an estimate of the effect on
vote choice of the as-if random assignment of an MC classified as having an Immigration History
as compared to the vote choice by an MC classified as not having an Immigration History. The
outcome variable yi denotes whether or not an MC cast a “pro” immigration vote, just as in the
previous section. The term f (Vi) is a flexible function of the winning candidate’s vote margin,
which determines who wins the election and therefore treatment status.
To estimate the RDD, we calculate optimal bandwidths and also use bandwidths of ±20 and
±10 for each regression. We estimate treatment effects using a local linear specification estimated
separately on each side of the threshold. These methods follow best practices outlined in Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).
One departure from the results presented in the previous section of this paper is that we must
restrict our estimates here only to include House members because we did not have enough ob-
servations in the Senate to perform the estimation and draw any conclusions — given the re-
quirement of including only elections with one candidate in the top third of the Surname Score
23
distribution and one candidate in the bottom third of the Surname Score distribution. We elected
not to pool across chambers given the different electoral dynamics for House and Senate races.
Estimating the effects separately using our four different measures of immigration history —
self, parents, grandparents and Immigration Index — we find a positive effect of having an im-
migration history on the probability of casting pro-immigration votes across all four measures.
Figure 4 illustrates the main findings using a linear functional form. The figures model the dis-
continuity between a narrow loss and a narrow win for a candidate with an immigration history
as compared to a candidate without such a history. The estimates range from a 42.1 percentage
point increase (Foreign Born (Self)) in the rate of casting a pro-immigration vote on the high end
to a 20.6 percentage point increase on the low end (Foreign-Born Grandparents).
24
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Figure 4: RDD: Effect of MC Immigration History (Surname Score) on probability of casting Pro
Immigration Vote, BW = ±10
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The size of the point estimates varies only slightly depending on the bandwidths that we em-
ploy. Table 4 reports full results for the calculated optimal bandwidths along with bandwidths
of ±10 and ±20. When attempting to measure the effect of an MC’s own foreign-born status on
pro-immigration votes, our estimates hover around an increase of 40 percentage points in the rate
of casting a pro-immigration vote, no matter the bandwidth (and none of the 95% confidence in-
tervals overlap with zero). When measuring the effect of foreign-born status of an MC’s parents
on vote choice, our estimates are slightly over 30 percentage points (and two of three of the 95%
confidence intervals do not overlap with zero). For grandparents, the estimates vary more widely,
ranging between 20.6 percentage points and 42 percentage points (here two of three 90% confi-
dence intervals do not overlap with zero, but all three 95% confidence intervals overlap). Finally,
when determining immigration status using the Immigration Index, which averages across self,
parents and grandparents, our estimates all suggest a slightly more than 25 percentage point in-
crease in pro-immigration voting rates when a candidate with a high immigration index holds
the seat as compared to when someone with a low immigration index holds the seat (one of three
estimates has 90% confidence intervals that do not overlap with zero).
These results help confirm the patterns observed in the previous section, and they suggest that
immigration history causes an MC to cast votes in favor of more permissive immigration policy.
When we vary the criterion that MCs with Surname Scores in the top third of the distribution
should be considered to have an immigration history, the results remain similar. See Section A.3.4
in the Appendix for details. We also confirm our findings with a battery of robustness checks. See
Appendix A.3.5 for additional details.24
Unbundling MC Immigrant Background
Having established that more recent familial immigration history leads MCs to cast roll-call votes
in support of more permissive immigration policies, we now turn to examining the conditions
under which legislators’ immigrant identities are more or less salient — when immigrant back-
24As compared to the RDD for immigration voting, the results of the RDD for immigration speech as the outcome
appear weaker. Table A6 in the Appendix shows that the results for speech are not robustly distinguishable from zero
and fluctuate depending on specification and bandwidth — consistent with our finding, discussed in the next section,
that district composition more strongly influences speech.
27
ground matters for representation and when it does not.
Congressional Speech and Immigrant Background
We first evaluate how an immigrant family history relates to an MC’s presentation of self through
floor speech. Floor speeches “increase members’ visibility and voice in the legislative process”
and provide chances for MCs to emphasize a policy area to their colleagues, constituents and the
press (Pearson and Dancey, 2011). At the same time, speech serves as a less costly signal than a
vote on a key policy issue. Speech is not binding; listeners interpret a speech’s meaning, which can
be revised and reinterpreted in ways that a roll-call vote cannot. However, congressional speech
is not entirely cheap talk; by taking a position on the record, MCs signal their views and priorities,
and they may face consequences later for taking votes contrary to their speeches.
For each Congress (64th–91st), we count the distinct number of times each MC used a phrase
related to the topic of immigration as well as the number of distinct speeches that include phrases
related to the topic of immigration. We estimate the same model as described in Equation 1,
but now replace the outcome measuring roll-call votes with a measure of floor speech, log(1 +
FloorSpeechit) where i indexes MCs and t indexes congresses. We also include Congress and
chamber fixed effects.
Table 5 presents the results.25 When we do not include covariates, we observe a statistically
significant and positive relationship between familial immigration history and floor speeches on
immigration, with the one exception of whether an MC herself or himself was foreign born. We
estimate that having a foreign-born parent increases the number of speeches including mentions
of immigration by roughly 7.4 percent; a foreign-born grandparent registers a 4.6 percent increase.
MCs with an immigrant background also speak about immigration in more personal terms.26
When we include covariates, the coefficients on our measures of family immigration history
remain positive and distinguishable from zero. However, the strength of the result for family
immigration history appears weaker for speech than for roll-call voting. First, for specifications
25In the Appendix, we include tables reporting identical results but using a count of phrases rather than speeches as
the outcome. See Tables A11 and A12.
26We found similar results for speeches where MCs referred to both immigration and family concurrently (see Ta-
bles A13 and A14 in the Appendix).
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with covariates in Table 5, the null hypothesis of no effect either cannot be rejected or can only
be rejected at p < 0.05 instead of p < 0.01. Second, immigrant population in the congressional
district emerges as a particularly important predictor for engaging in immigration-related speech.
When we use standardized coefficients to evaluate the explanatory power of family immigration
history versus district composition, foreign-born population in the congressional district has a rel-
ative importance 3 times that of immigration history. A one standard deviation change in district
foreign-born population yields a 0.118 change in speech on immigration; for foreign-born parents,
there is a 0.039 change.27 When the outcome is immigration roll-call votes, the relative importance
of these covariates registers as roughly equal (0.15 versus 0.12).
This pattern of results suggests that MCs who represented districts with substantial foreign-
born populations weight district composition more heavily than their own family histories when
choosing whether to speak on immigration. Such floor speeches allow MCs to engage in position
taking, essentially responding to the incentives in place for their district. Local press often re-
ported directly on speeches given by a district’s representatives.28 As a result, composition of the
district appears to have been a key factor driving this form of behavior. On the other hand, MCs
weighted family immigration history and district composition roughly equally for roll-call votes.
While diverging from district expectations on roll-call votes was costly too, deeply-held prefer-
ences — such as those explained by a family history of immigration — appear to have contributed
to making such choices.
Visible Indicators of Immigrant Background
Impressions held by others also influence lawmaker behavior. We examine how visible indicators
of an immigrant background influence an MC’s decision-making on key immigration roll-call
votes, holding actual immigration history constant.
Table 6 reports the results of regressions where we include the measures of family immigration
27Other measures of relative importance, such as the contribution to R2 when adding the variable studied to a
specification last, yield similar findings.
28See Schlagend, Argumente gegen Einwanderungsbill, In der Haus-Debatte vorgebracht (1914) as an example of a German-
language newspaper reporting at length on speeches by representatives in the congressional debates on literacy test
legislation. An English-language translation of article’s sub-header reads: “The battle of speeches raged for several
hours. [. . . ] Friends of immigrants fought their hardest against the literacy test clause.”
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history as well as Surname Scores for each MC.
This approach decomposes family immigration history into an MC’s actual family history and
the public perception of family immigration history based on population-level statistics. Consider
an MC who has one foreign-born parent but a surname that does not indicate a recent family
history of immigration (for example, “Smith” averaged 0.03 foreign-born parents among people
in the South in 1930). Now compare this to someone who also has one foreign-born parent but
who possesses a surname suggesting a high probability of an immigrant background (for exam-
ple, “Sundstrom” indicated on average 1.56 foreign-born parents for someone born at the turn of
the century in the Northeast). This estimation procedure identifies whether this type of variation
in surname leads to meaningfully different behavior on immigration roll-call votes. We have hy-
pothesized that visible indicators of an immigrant background do in fact lead to adopting more
permissive attitudes on immigration.
Our estimates appear to bear out this hypothesis. Across all four specifications, the coefficient
on the surname score variable registers as equal to or bigger than the magnitude of the coefficient
on actual immigration history. The difference appears most extreme for an MC’s own foreign-born
status; this result likely occurs because while few MCs were themselves born abroad, a surname
indicating a significant probability of foreign birth also suggests a likelihood of foreign-born par-
ents and grandparents, which we know also influences vote choice. For our other measures, the
size of the coefficients are roughly equal and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality be-
tween the coefficients.
There are several possible mechanisms that could cause an MC with an immigrant surname to
vote differently than an MC whose surname does not indicate recent immigration history. For
example, when MCs have surnames visibly identifying their family histories of immigration,
their constituents might view them as “descriptive representatives” and expect them to take pro-
immigrant positions on legislation. For that matter, an immigrant surname might boost the elec-
tion chances of an MC in a district with immigrant constituents, in turn reinforcing a role as a de-
scriptive representative. A second possibility is that life (before Congress) with an immigrant sur-
name leads to different treatment by others, regardless of actual immigration background, and this
31
Table 6: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled with Foreign Surnames
Pro Immigration Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MC Foreign Born 0.088
(0.057)
Surname MC Foreign Born 0.341∗∗∗
(0.082)
Parents Foreign Born 0.059∗∗∗
(0.013)
Surname Parents Foreign Born 0.072∗∗∗
(0.024)
Grandparents Foreign Born 0.021∗∗∗
(0.008)
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born 0.031∗∗
(0.013)
Immigration Index 0.046∗∗∗
(0.015)
Surname Immigration Index 0.059∗∗∗
(0.022)
log(CD Pop. Foreign) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Bill FE yes yes yes yes
Chamber FE yes yes yes yes
N 3,367 3,126 1,976 1,968
R2 0.446 0.445 0.455 0.459
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
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treatment alters the MC’s identity and leads them to represent their districts differently. While we
cannot distinguish between these potential mechanisms, the effect remains the same: being easily
identifiable as having an immigrant background (holding actual background constant) changes
how MCs represent their districts on immigration.
Unbundling immigrant history into the distinct backgrounds of specific family members high-
lights another aspect of immigrant background. In Appendix Table A7, we split out the foreign-
born status of each parent and grandparent separately. These results reveal a striking pattern: in
the era we study, paternal ancestry (coupled with surname) affects vote choice more than maternal
ancestry. Appendix Section A.3.6 discusses this phenomenon in more detail.
Nation of Origin
We have shown that an MC’s general family immigration history affected their voting patterns
on immigration restrictions. But while “immigrant” or “descendant of immigrants” is one salient
dimension of MC background, it elides variation in immigrant experience by country or continent
of origin. In addition, while immigration restriction bills can be simply coded as pro or anti immi-
gration, the legislation is often more complex: as an example, while the Johnson-Reed Act in 1924
severely curtailed immigration from Italy, the quotas were non-binding on Irish immigrants.
In this section, we show that region of origin mattered for immigration votes. Before World
War II, MCs with family trees rooted in southern and eastern Europe (the “New European” source
countries during the Age of Mass Migration), were more likely to vote against immigration restric-
tion bills than MCs of “Old European” stock, and subtleties about the exact restrictions mattered
as well.29 After WWII, for votes on the bills that reshaped American immigration policy — in par-
ticular the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 — the effects of MC immigrant backgrounds
were similar, whether the MCs’ parents or grandparents came from New or Old Europe or the rest
of the world.
We start by examining the three immigration restriction bills of the interwar era (Table 7). We
regress a dummy for pro-immigration votes on MC immigrant family history, dividing origins by
29We base these codings on Goldin (1994). Section A.2.5 in the Appendix lists the countries that comprise Old Europe
and New Europe.
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region: New Europe, Old Europe, and Non Europe. Specifically, we count the number of parents
(0, 1, or 2) and number of grandparents (0 to 4) who are born in each region, with American-
born parents and grandparents as the reference group. Though MCs with any (recent) European
family immigration history are more likely to vote against the three immigration restriction bills,
the effects are much larger for MCs with more parents or grandparents from New Europe.30 Each
of these bills symbolically and practically targeted immigrant populations other than those from
Old Europe. The Immigration Act (1917) primarily implemented a literacy test (and also included
exemptions for close family members of current immigrants). The Immigration Quota Act (1921)
was projected to alter the distribution of immigrants such that Old Europe source countries would
comprise 55% of immigrants and New Europe countries would comprise 45%; the Reed-Johnson
Act aimed to further tip the balance to 84% Old Europe and 16% New Europe (Tichenor, 2002, p.
145). In sum, in the moments leading up to final passage, each of these bills appeared to target
immigrants from places other than New Europe most harshly, though to varying degrees.
Strikingly, the results in Table 7 identify conditions under which the general tendency towards
permissive immigration legislation held by those with immigrant backgrounds may break down
somewhat. When restrictive immigration policies targeted specific immigrant sub-groups (i.e.,
New Europe immigrants), country of origin operates as a key predictor of MC roll-call voting.
We implement hypothesis tests with the null that the coefficient on New Europe Parents (Grand-
parents) equals the coefficient on Old Europe Parents (Grandparents). For the Immigration Act
(1917), which implemented a literacy test but did not drastically alter the balance of New Europe
immigrants, the difference in coefficients is relatively fuzzy. We cannot reject the null of no dif-
ference at p = 0.10 for Old Europe versus New Europe parents or grandparents. On the other
hand, for the Immigration Quota Act and Johnson-Reed Act, both of which placed stricter quotas
on New Europe immigrants, we can reject the null of no difference for parents and grandparents
at p < 0.01 (specifications 3, 4 and 6) and p < 0.05 (specification 5).
Did the patterns change after WWII? Here we focus on four bills from the House of Represen-
tatives: the McCarran Internal Security Act, the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality
30The effects of Non-European immigration history is a bit noisier and harder to interpret, but in these Congresses,
this group is much smaller.
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Act, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Table 8).
The McCarran Internal Security Act, enacted over Truman’s veto, targeted Communists early in
the Cold War. One provision relevant for our study: immigrants could have citizenship revoked if
found in violation of the law within five years of naturalization. Old European heritage led to vot-
ing pro immigrant (against the act); New European heritage (columns 1 and 2) did as well, though
with an effect of a smaller magnitude. Enacted two years later, the McCarran-Walter Immigration
and Nationality Act resembled in some ways the pre-WWII immigration restriction bills, retaining
a quota system. MCs with New Europe immigration history were much more likely to oppose it
than those from Old Europe (columns 3 and 4).
But while the McCarran-Walter bill activated identity based on national origins just as pre-
WWII restriction bills had, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1965 appear different. MC immigrant background had similar (positive) effects on casting
a permissive vote, regardless of where those MCs’ families came from originally. None of the
effects estimated in columns 5, 6, 7, or 8 of Table 8 allow us to reject the null of no difference
between Old Europe and New Europe coefficients.
These results suggest that when MCs faced a vote on legislation restricting immigration of peo-
ple with similar family backgrounds to themselves, they were more likely to oppose the bill. While
immigrants of all backgrounds had higher probabilities of opposing immigration restrictions, leg-
islation targeting people of different backgrounds produced different levels of opposition. This
result suggests one potential reason why recent congresses have struggled with immigration pol-
icy: while many current MCs are not far from the immigrant experience, fewer share an immigrant
background with the groups currently seeking to immigrate at the highest rates.
Immigrant Background and the 115th Congress
Do MCs with immigrant backgrounds have a common tendency towards permissive immigra-
tion legislation in the contemporary Congress? If so, does it play a role in influencing legislative
behavior on immigration policy?
We gathered additional data on the family histories of MCs in the 115th Congress and repeated
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our analysis on immigration roll-call voting.31 We identified four key pieces of immigration legis-
lation — two in the House and two in the Senate — and studied the relationship between permis-
sive immigration votes and family immigration history. In the House we chose HR 4760 and HR
3004: the “Securing America’s Future Act of 2018” and “Kate’s Law.” In the Senate we chose Sen-
ate Amendment 1948 to Senate Amendment 1959 as well as Senate Amendment 1959 to HR 2579:
an amendment to the “Stop Dangerous Sanctuary Cities Act” and an amendment to the “Broader
Options for Americans Act.” See Appendix Section A.1.3 for details.
An inspection of the voting by party and family history illustrates that this feature still matters
in the contemporary Congress. Republicans who cast “Nay” votes averaged 0.193 foreign-born
parents and 1.3 foreign-born grandparents; Republicans casting “Yea” (i.e., restrictive) votes av-
eraged just 0.035 foreign-born parents and 0.514 foreign-born grandparents. We observe a similar
pattern but with a slightly smaller gap for Democrats. Of the 86 Democratic MCs who cast at least
one vote coded as permissive, at least 64 had a foreign-born parent or grandparent.
Table 9 presents the regression results for the 115th Congress. First, the effect sizes we esti-
mate for foreign-born parents and grandparents generally appear similar to historical congresses
(though notably, an MC’s own foreign-born status is no longer significant). Second, party plays
a much larger role in the contemporary Congress. Republican party membership was associated
with casting permissive immigration votes at a roughly 22 percentage point lower rate in historical
congresses; in the contemporary Congress we estimate an effect that is double that magnitude. The
average contribution of party to R2 across orderings of regressors (Lindeman, Merenda and Gold,
1980; Grömping, 2007) increases ten-fold from historical congresses to the contemporary Congress
(0.022 to 0.22) and the standardized coefficient on party more than doubles (0.21 to 0.47); on the
other hand, the Parents Foreign Born variable retains roughly the same importance in both time
periods.
Comparing the current to the past composition of Congress also helps shed light on the shifting
dynamics surrounding immigrant background. In the House, the average MC has fewer foreign-
born parents in the 115th Congress than in the era studied in this paper, regardless of party (0.09
31To gather this additional data, we referred to official biographies, newspaper articles and other sources; we cross-
referenced our data with a list provided by Geiger (2019), who focuses on the 116th Congress.
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Table 9: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: 115th Congress
Pro Immigration Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MC Foreign Born 0.101
(0.086)
Parents Foreign Born 0.059∗
(0.033)
Grandparents Foreign Born 0.041∗∗
(0.020)
Immigration Index 0.105∗∗
(0.044)
log(CD Pop. Foreign) 0.024 0.015 0.040 0.035
(0.022) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037)
Republican −0.478∗∗∗ −0.474∗∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗ −0.318∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.065) (0.064)
Other Party −0.269∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ −0.197 −0.229
(0.089) (0.099) (0.171) (0.174)
Northeast 0.089∗ 0.098∗ 0.151 0.161∗
(0.053) (0.054) (0.094) (0.094)
South −0.028 −0.029 −0.107 −0.109
(0.045) (0.045) (0.082) (0.081)
West 0.117∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.071 0.075
(0.053) (0.054) (0.092) (0.092)
Age −0.019 −0.020 0.012 0.011
(0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.024)
Age Sq. 0.0001 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tenure 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Tenure Sq. −0.00005 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Bill FE yes yes yes yes
Chamber FE yes yes yes yes
N 616 602 214 214
R2 0.325 0.330 0.288 0.290
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
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foreign-born parents in the 115th Congress for Republicans versus an average of 0.42 in the 64th
– 91st; 0.33 versus 0.4 for Democrats). But the drop off for Republican MCs is particularly large,
and this decline began even during the last part of our sample period. In the Senate, the partisan
differences appear even sharper. For Senate Democrats, the mean foreign-born parents in the
115th Congress (0.31) roughly equals the mean from the past (0.30); for Republicans in the Senate,
the drop off is steep (0.33 to 0.075). Figure 5 displays the trends over time.
Scholars have noted that immigration policy has grown increasingly structured by party (Abra-
jano and Hajnal, 2017), a phenomenon in line with increasing polarization. Our estimates confirm
that MCs place increased weight on party when deciding how to vote on immigration policy in
the contemporary Congress. But, the empirical regularities described in this paper, in conjunction
with the shifting composition of parties in terms of MC familial immigration histories, also pro-
vide a partial explanation for the change in the dynamics surrounding immigration. In the past,
even though white males comprised the majority of both parties, many MCs had family histories
that helped shape permissive views on immigration legislation. We have shown that foreign-born
parents and grandparents increased an MC’s tendency to cast permissive immigration votes, in-
dependent of party. Republican MCs still have immigrant family histories, but increasingly these
family stories of immigration are in the distant past. Our results illustrate the almost linear de-
crease in the effect of immigrant history over generations; a reasonable extrapolation suggests
that 3rd, 4th or 5th generation MCs do not meaningfully draw upon immigrant background when
casting votes on immigration policy. Recent immigrant background, which might undergird a
common tendency towards permissive immigration policy, no longer cuts across parties.
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Figure 5: These figures illustrate mean foreign-born parents by party and chamber of congress.
The gray bounds indicate the maximum and minimum mean foreign-born parents possible when
accounting for missing data on foreign-born parents.
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Conclusion
This paper has focused on immigrant background and its effects on legislative behavior. Our
results demonstrate a strong relationship between personal immigration history and MC vote
choice on immigration policy in the early and mid-20th century. MCs born abroad or with parents
or grandparents born abroad voted in favor of pro-immigration policies more than those whose
families immigrated to the United States in earlier generations. This voting behavior is not just
the result of pro-immigrant electorates selecting MCs with recent family immigration background,
but occurs independently of district characteristics and selection. Recent immigration experiences
serve as strong predictors of votes for permissive policies even when MC ideology would predict
otherwise. All together, these findings suggest that in the first part of the 20th century some MCs
drew upon a common immigrant identity when shaping immigration policy. While some land-
mark bills passed by Congress harshly restricted immigration, those MCs with familial histories
of immigration were substantially less likely to support such policies, regardless of party.
While a Congress with MCs who have family histories of immigration may contribute to sup-
port for permissive immigration policies, this is contingent upon a variety of factors. Position
taking through congressional speech appears to be most of all a function of district composition
rather than an MC’s identity: district composition (i.e., foreign-born population) explains speech
about immigration more so than an immigrant background. Visibility of immigrant identity plays
an important role in legislative behavior too: holding actual immigration history constant, an im-
migrant surname increases the probability of casting permissive immigration votes. Our analysis
also reveals the importance of nation or place of origin in the construction of identity: when faced
with immigration restrictions based on nationality, MCs tended to give more support to the im-
migration of people with the same origins as themselves, though even here a common tendency
to vote for permissive immigration persisted.
Finally, our results speak to legislative dynamics in the present-day Congress. As compared
to the first part of the 20th century, the average immigration histories for the two parties have
diverged considerably, with levels among Republicans at all-time lows. Given the empirical rela-
tionship we have identified between immigrant family history and permissive voting on legisla-
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tion, this shift in the composition of the parties serves as one additional reason why immigration
policy is no longer the cross-cutting issue that it once was.
More broadly, understanding a legislator’s family history and its role in the construction of
identity helps us understand legislative behavior. Fenno (1978) famously asked what elected rep-
resentatives see when they look at their constituency, sparking a voluminous literature investigat-
ing legislator behavior in the district. Our paper has sought to turn a lens inward. We have tried
to ask: What do legislators see when they look at themselves? Our paper suggests that answers to
this question must be taken into account when studying the behavior of elected representatives in
a legislature.
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A Appendix to “Descended from Immigrants and Revolutionists”: How
Family Immigration History Shapes Representation in Congress
A.1 Supplementary Historical Information
A.1.1 U.S. Immigration Policy
Since the First Congress, legislators have grappled with immigration and citizenship policies.
These policies, and specifically legislator roll-call votes and floor speech, provide the basis for
our measures of legislative behavior related to immigration policy. Evaluating these outcomes
requires some background on immigration policy in Congress. The Naturalization Act of 1790
marked the first comprehensive immigration policy set forth by Congress and, as did later acts
of Congress, balanced naturalization of some citizens — free Whites who met certain residence
and character requirements — with exclusion of others — American Indians and enslaved peo-
ples to name but a few. In the two centuries since, immigration policy has not moved linearly
towards more openness. Rather, U.S. immigration policy can be characterized as a sequence of
restrictive and expansive policy regimes, responding to changes in the political environment over
time (Tichenor, 2002). In this framework, institutional “veto points” and “opportunity points”
help structure the processes from which immigration policies emerge. Changes in party systems
may yield structural advantages (or disadvantages) for political actors; coalitions spanning party
and ideology may develop in response to existing government institutions and policies; and, in-
ternational events may influence the opportunities for policy change available to domestic actors.
Yet, while this historical-institutionalist approach does well to examine the fundamental institu-
tional conditions that help shape policy opportunities and obstacles, it has less to say about the
characteristics that determine the views of key decision-makers in the first place. For example, the
largely restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies coming out of Congress in the first quar-
ter of the 20th century, capping all immigration and favoring immigrants from Northern Europe,
can be explained in part by veto and opportunity points but also by a restrictionist outlook that
emerged among political actors.
The size and scope of immigration to the U.S. has been determined by three main factors his-
1
torically: the costs of migration, the benefits to the migrants, and American policy (Abramitzky
and Boustan, 2017). As these three factors have changed over time, total flows and the selection
of immigrants has changed. The Age of Mass Migration — dating from the late nineteenth cen-
tury to the immigration restriction acts of 1917, 1921, and 1924 — was made possible by falling
costs of trans-Atlantic transportation, relatively open border policies, and the industrializing and
urbanizing American economy (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). This historical moment did not
just coincide with an increase in the number of immigrants, but also a significant shift in their
source countries. As Abramitzky and Boustan (2017) document, in 1850, more than 90% of the
foreign-born in the U.S. came from Northern and Western Europe, mostly Great Britain, Ireland,
and Germany. Seventy years later, the foreign-born population in the U.S. was split between old
and new Europe, 45% from “old” sending countries and 41% from “new”.
A.1.2 Immigration Bills
We now describe the major immigration legislation for which we measure roll-call votes. The
Immigration Act of 1917 was the first major bill designed to restrict European immigration into
the United States that ultimately went into law. Passed by Congress over Woodrow Wilson’s veto
at the end of the 64th Congress, the act imposed a literacy test on European immigrants, and
barred immigrants from Asian countries. The Immigration Quota Act (also called the Emergency
Immigration Act of 1921 or Immigration Act of 1921) capped the number of immigrants and set
quotas for immigration based on the number of people of each nationality already residing in the
United States. The Immigration Act of 1924 (the Johnson-Reed Act) further lowered the number
of immigrants allowed each year and heavily favored Northern European immigrants over those
from Southern or Eastern Europe.32 All three bills passed each chamber by large margins.
A second cluster of immigration acts followed World War II. The Displaced Persons Act of
1948 and Refugee Relief Act of 1953 temporarily increased the number of immigrants admitted
due to the vast number of refugees in Europe after the war.33 The McCarran-Walter Immigra-
32For a detailed account of the politics of immigration reform, see Tichenor (2002).
33The House of Representatives did not hold a final roll-call vote on the Displace Persons Act of 1948; we only
include the Senate vote in our analysis.
2
tion and Nationality Act, passed by Congress in 1952 over the veto of Harry Truman, reorganized
and consolidated immigration laws while preserving strict nationality quotas limiting immigra-
tion. Finally, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 overhauled the immigration system
once again, eliminating the nationality-based quota system and replacing it with a multi-category
system that prioritized special skills or having relatives already residing in the United States. The
long-term effect of the bill was to end the preference for Northern European immigrants and allow
for increased immigration from the rest of the world. Abramitzky and Boustan (2017) suggest that
the 1965 bill led to a new era of Mass Migration, albeit with very different source countries than
the previous one.
3
Table A1: Immigration Bills
Congress Bill
Roll
Call #
Pro
Immigrant Yea∗ Nay∗
64 HR10384 Immigration Act of 1917
House 121 Nay 309 117
Senate 324 Nay 65 22
67 HR4075 Immigration Quota Act
House 21 Nay 285 41
Senate 21 Nay 90 2
68 HR7995 Immigration Act of 1924 (Johnson-Reed Act)
House 90 Nay 319 72
Senate 126 Nay 72 11
80 S2242 Displaced Persons Act of 1948
House N/A (no final roll-call vote)
Senate 198 Yea 75 17
81 HR9490 McCarran Internal Security Act
S4037 House 264 Nay 302 56
Senate 444 Nay 77 12
82 HR5678 McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act
House 165 Nay 284 116
Senate 298 Nay 60 31
83 HR6481 Refugee Relief Act of 1953
House 64 Yea 225 189
Senate 82 Yea 63 30
89 HR2580 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965
House 177 Yea 330 79
Senate 232 Yea 80 20
∗Yeas and Nays include announced votes and paired votes.
4
A.1.3 Immigration Legislation in the 115th Congress
Here we describe the bills used as outcome variables in our assessment of immigration voting in
the 115th Congress. The House votes occurred on legislation that (1) proposed funding for a bor-
der wall as well as limits on legal immigration among other things; and (2) increased the penalties
for undocumented immigrants who re-entered the country after already being convicted of crimes
and deported. The Senate votes sought cloture on debate over legislation (1) withholding funding
from “sanctuary cities”; and (2) allocating funds for border security, placing limits on family-
based immigration and eliminating the visa lottery while also providing a path to citizenship for
“Dreamers”.34 For these bills, we coded a “Nay” as a permissive vote.35
34We drew these descriptions from https://ballotpedia.org/115th_Congress_on_immigration,_2017-2018.
35While the path to citizenship for “Dreamers” in the last Senate bill complicates the coding somewhat, our best
interpretation is that other restrictive aspects of the legislation were seen as unacceptable encroachments by many
pro-immigration groups and policy-makers.
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A.2 Supplementary Data Details
A.2.1 Census Linking Overview
The complete 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 Federal Censuses have recently been digitized by a
joint effort of Ancestry.com and the Minnesota Population Center. The restricted-access version of
the data, managed by IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2010) and housed at the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), includes transcribed names that enable us to link to external data sources at the
individual-level. We search for each member in each of the decennial Federal Censuses from 1900
to 1940 to link MCs to census records.
A.2.2 Discussion of Census-Linking Procedures
In recent work, Enamorado, Fifield and Imai (2019) propose a probabilistic linking method to
match records across individual-level datasets like voter files. Though similar to other meth-
ods used in the historical census record linking literature like Abramitzky, Mill and Pérez (2019)
in that it uses an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, we turn to the Feigenbaum (2016,
2018) method for three key reasons. First, in a recent review of historical census linking methods,
Abramitzky et al. (2019) finds that the most commonly used methods trace out a frontier, trad-
ing off false positives and false negatives in linking. The Feigenbaum method, by replicating the
hand links a trained researcher would make, does particularly well at minimizing false negatives
or records for which a true match exists but is not recovered. Because we link from high quality
source data (the Congressional Biographical Directories including middle names and exact dates
of birth) and link into five censuses, we believe we are creating a linked sample that is unlikely to
have many false positives as well. Second, Abramitzky et al. (2019) also note that choice of exact
historical linking method, among those commonly used by recent economic historians working
with the complete count census, tends not to affect research conclusions. Third, as McVeigh, Spahn
and Murray (2019) find when evaluating the Enamorado, Fifield and Imai (2019) method with his-
torical data, methods developed to deal with the linking challenges of modern data (fuzzy street
addresses and typos in string and numeric fields) may not be the best tool to apply to historical
6
data likely to contain transcription errors, respondent to enumerator noise, and degradation of
raw sources over time.
A.2.3 Surname Scores
Surname-based measures are useful for individuals for whom we have less available information.
This includes older MCs who we are unlikely to find residing at home with their parents. In ad-
dition, it is extremely difficult to census link failed candidates for Congress: for these challengers,
we rarely observe either year of birth or place of birth, two variables key to census linking. Sur-
name scores allow us to proxy for immigration histories of these challengers. And, in subsequent
analyses, they provide a measure for public perceptions or visibility of immigrant background
since they report the average immigration background for an individual based on surname alone.
Figure A1 illustrates the correspondence between Immigration Historyi and Surname Scorei
for House members. Each dot in a figure represents the average outcomes for all MCs in the
sample by state.
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Figure A1: Comparison of Actual Foreign-Born Status to Imputed Foreign-Born Status (Surname
Scores) by State, House Members
8
A.2.4 Key Terms for Identifying Topics of Speech
The key terms to identify immigration speech are: “across border”, “administr foreign”, “allow
foreign”, “along border”, “american foreign”, “beyond border”, “billion foreign”, “border pa-
trol”, “border protect”, “border region”, “border secur”, “border state”, “border unit”, “broken
immigr”, “canadian border”, “citizenship immigr”, “come foreign”, “come illeg”, “comprehens
immigr”, “control border”, “countri illeg”, “custom border”, “enforc immigr”, “feder immigr”,
“flow illeg”, “foreign born”, “foreign languag”, “foreign student”, “foreign worker”, “illeg activ”,
“illeg immigr”, “immigr act”, “immigr children”, “immigr come”, “immigr countri”, “immigr
custom”, “immigr enforc”, “immigr issu”, “immigr natur”, “immigr polici”, “immigr problem”,
“immigr reform”, “immigr refuge”, “immigr servic”, “immigr status”, “immigr subcommitte”,
“immigr system”, “immigr unit”, “immigr visa”, “involv foreign”, “legal illeg”, “legal immigr”,
“mani foreign”, “mexican border”, “million foreign”, “million illeg”, “nation border”, “nation im-
migr”, “need foreign”, “northern border”, “open border”, “peopl foreign”, “peopl illeg”, “percent
foreign”, “protect border”, “reform immigr”, “report foreign”, “resid alien”, “restrict immigr”,
“secur border”, “side border”, “southern border”, “southwest border”, “state border”, “state il-
leg”, “stop illeg”, “subcommitte immigr”, “undocu immigr”, “undocu worker”, “within border”.
The key terms to identify family speech are: “mother”, “father”, “grandmoth”, “grandfath”,
“uncl”, “aunt”, “cousin”, “brother”, “sister”, “parent”, “grandpar”, “children”, “famili”, “re-
lat”, “kin”, “clan”, “hous”, “household”, “home”, “sibl”, “lineag”, “blood”, “brood”, “descend”,
“legaci”, “inherit”, “genealog”, “in-law”, “folk”, “ancestor”, “root”, “spous”, “wife”, “husband”,
“marriag”, “wed”.
A.2.5 Coding Places of Origin into Regions
We identify regions of origin based on the birth countries of parents and grandparents. Countries
are grouped into regions as follows:
Old Europe includes people with census country codes for Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland,
Iceland, Lapland, Norway, Svalbard and Jan Meyen, Svalbard, Jan Meyen, Sweden, England,
Channel Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Scotland, Wales, United Kingdom, Ireland, North-
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ern Ireland, Northern Europe, Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Alsace, Lorraine, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Switzerland, Western Europe, Austria, Austria-Hungary,
Austria-Graz, Austria-Linz, Austria-Salzburg, Austria-Tyrol, Austria-Vienna, Austria-Kaernten,
Austria-Neustadt, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Bohemia, Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, Czech Re-
public, Germany, Berlin, West Berlin, East Berlin, West Germany, Baden, Bavaria, Braunschweig,
Bremen, Hamburg, Hanover, Hessen, Hesse-Nassau, Lippe, Lubeck, Oldenburg, Rheinland, Schaumburg-
Lippe, Schleswig, Sigmaringen, Schwarzburg, Westphalia, Wurttemberg, Waldeck, Wittenberg,
Frankfurt, Saarland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, East Germany, Anhalt, Brandenburg, Kingdom of Sax-
ony, Mecklenburg, Saxony, Thuringian States, Sachsen-Meiningen, Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach, Prob-
able Saxony, Schwerin, Strelitz, Probably Thuringian States, Prussia, Hohenzollern, and Nieder-
sachsen.
New Europe includes people with census country codes for Albania, Andorra, Gibraltar, Greece,
Dodecanese Islands, Turkey Greece, Macedonia, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Azores, Madeira Islands,
Cape Verde Islands, St. Miguel, San Marino, Spain, Vatican City, Southern Europe, Hungary,
Poland, Austrian Poland, Galicia, German Poland, East Prussia, Pomerania, Posen, Prussian Poland,
Silesia, West Prussia, Russian Poland, Romania, Transylvania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Montenegro,
Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Slovonia, Carniola, Slovenia, Kosovo, Central Europe, Eastern Europe,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Baltic States, Other USSR/R¨ussia,¨ Byelorussia, Moldavia, Bessara-
bia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhik, Turk-
menistan, Uzbekistan, Siberia, USSR, Europe.
A.3 Supplementary Analysis
A.3.1 Miscast Votes
Family history of immigration also helps us explain ideologically-surprising or “miscast” votes
on immigration issues. Specifically, we examine bills where (1) an MC was predicted to vote
pro immigration based on their ideological position (as measured by both dimensions of DW-
NOMINATE) but instead voted anti immigration; and, (2) an MC was predicted to vote anti im-
migration but instead voted pro immigration. These “miscast” votes allow us to examine instances
10
where immigration history led MCs to depart from what would be predicted by their overall po-
litical ideology. This approach moves beyond simply controlling for party, as in Table 3, which is
useful because restrictionist ideologies cut across both parties, for example by bringing together
Southern Democrats and some Western Republicans.
To implement this test, we divided our data into sub-samples: (1) Individuals predicted to
cast a “pro” immigration vote; and, (2) individuals predicted to cast an “anti” immigration vote.
Within each subsample, we then coded all individuals with a “miscast” vote with a 1 and those
who voted according to expectations with a 0. Appendix Table A2 reports the results. In all cases,
the direction of the effects accords with our expectations. First, immigration history predicts a
reduced rate of diverging from pre-existing ideology when an MC is predicted to vote in favor
of immigration. We estimate that being foreign born is associated with a reduction of 11 percent-
age points in the rates of casting an anti-immigration vote that departs from existing ideology; an
additional foreign-born parent is associated with a reduction of 4 percentage points; and a one
percentage point effect for additional foreign-born grandparents. We also observe a positive rela-
tionship between immigration history and casting a pro vote despite having an overall political
ideology that would predict casting an anti vote, with effect sizes similar to the prior case, but in
the opposite direction.
11
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A.3.2 Replicating Main Results Using Surname Scores
Another possibility is that the pattern of missing data — particularly for foreign-born grandpar-
ents — might somehow bias our results. In particular, missingness for this measure occurs in our
earliest sample years. As one check against this possibility, we re-estimate our core results using
estimated immigration histories based on surname, which has the advantage of no missingness
(though measures everyone’s immigration history with some error). Table A3 in the Appendix
replicates the results from Table 3 using only foreign-born scores derived from an MCs surname
and finds similar results as to when we measured immigration history using individual level cen-
sus data.
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Table A3: Immigration History and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled with Foreign Surnames
Pro Immigration Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Surname MC Foreign Born 0.361∗∗∗
(0.083)
Surname Parents Foreign Born 0.120∗∗∗
(0.020)
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born 0.055∗∗∗
(0.009)
Surname Immigration Index 0.103∗∗∗
(0.016)
log(CD Pop. Foreign) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Republican −0.216∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Other Party 0.117 0.134 0.146 0.131
(0.115) (0.115) (0.116) (0.114)
Northeast 0.121∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
South −0.241∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
West −0.033 −0.024 −0.021 −0.021
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Age −0.012∗ −0.012∗ −0.011∗ −0.011∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Age Sq. 0.0001 0.0001∗ 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Tenure −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure Sq. 0.00003 0.00003 0.00004 0.00003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Bill FE yes yes yes yes
Chamber FE yes yes yes yes
N 3,367 3,367 3,362 3,352
R2 0.446 0.449 0.449 0.451
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
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A.3.3 Bill by Bill Results
We turn to examine vote by vote effects across chambers. Rather than pool all votes together
and include bill fixed effects, we instead estimate the model specified in Equation 1 but with the
sample restricted by vote and by chamber. Figure A2 reports the results for the House and the
Senate. For the Senate, we had to omit several votes; in some cases, we had insufficient varia-
tion in the outcome variable (i.e., HR4075 was a 90-2 vote) or insufficient data on foreign-born
grandparents.36
In the House, we observe consistently positive and significant effects; both foreign-born par-
ents and foreign-born grandparents were strongly associated with casting pro-immigration votes.
In the Senate, the bill by bill results appear more mixed. Looking at parental immigration history,
the effects register as positive for six of seven bills, but in most cases we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis of no effect. A similar pattern persists when examining foreign-born grandparent effects
in the Senate.
36HR10384, the Immigration Act of 1917, lacked enough data on foreign-born grandparents. This was because most
MCs voting were also adults in 1900 or 1910 and not living with their parents. This made it difficult to determine the
immigration histories of their grandparents.
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Figure A2: Effect of Foreign-Born Parents and Grandparents on Pro Immigration Vote on Individ-
ual Bills
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A.3.4 RDD Thresholds
The specific choice of threshold distinguishing “high” versus “low” probability of family immi-
gration history based on surname does not appear to matter for the results. Figure A3 visuall
displays the RDD results for different threshold choices. Moving from left to right along the x-axis
varies the threshold calculation used to determine when the binary variable indicating an immi-
grant family history takes a value equal to one. For example, when x = 0 individuals with a
Surname Score higher than the 50th percentile are classified as having a family immigration his-
tory and individuals whose Surname Score is below the 50th percentile are not. When x = 10,
then individuals with a Surname Score higher than the 60th percentile are classified as having a
family immigration history equal to one and individuals with a Surname Score less than or equal
to the 40th percentile are assigned a zero. As we move to the right, we increasingly restrict the size
of the sample until it is no longer reasonable to perform the estimation. We continued to estimate
the RDD results as long as we retained at least 50 effective observations.
Across all measures and all Surname Score thresholds, the results remain positive. In general,
as we grow more restrictive in terms of defining who does and does not have a surname that
denotes a family immigration history the effect sizes increase. This makes intuitive sense: setting
x = 0 classifies some people as having an immigration history equal to one and others with an
immigration history equal to zero when their Surname Scores are very similar (i.e., someone in the
49th percentile would have an indicator variable equal to zero and someone in the 51st percentile
would have the indicator set to one). Such a coarse division likely adds considerable noise to our
estimates. As the threshold grows more stringent, the distinction between a surname indicating
an MC with a family history of immigration with an MC who does not have such a history grows
sharper — until we no longer have enough observations to estimate the effects.
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Figure A3: RDD Robustness Check: Sensitivity of Estimates to Surname Score Cutoff Donut for
Treatment Assignment (Optimal BW). The figures illustrate the effect of MC Immigration History
(Surname Score) on probability of casting Pro Immigration Vote
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A.3.5 RDD Robustness Checks
Table A4 reports the results of the same estimation procedure as in the main RDD, but using
placebo outcomes as the dependent variable. We estimate the effects of quasi-random assignment
of an MC with an immigrant history on pre-treatment covariates including age, party, and region.
Across all of these placebo outcomes, we do not observe any meaningful relationship. Table A5
reports continuity checks for the RDD results. We reformulate our estimation as if the threshold
between winning and losing an election was 0.5± c and re-estimate the results. Given that these
thresholds are artificially constructed, we should observe no meaningful relationship between an
MC’s immigration history and the outcome; put differently, we should not observe a jump in the
probability of casting a pro-immigration vote anywhere except the actual threshold between elect-
ing an MC with versus without an immigrant background. Again, we do not observe statistically
significant results at any of the alternative thresholds.
Table A4: RDD Robustness Check with Placebo Outcome Variables: Imputed Immigration His-
tory (Surname Score) and Vote Choice, All Bills Pooled (House, Foreign Born Parents Determine
Treatment Status)
Age Dem Northeast South Midwest West
Estimate -1.192 0.17 0.101 -0.035 -0.194 0.134
(3.241) (0.202) (0.18) (0.1) (0.182) (0.209)
N 278 278 278 278 278 278
N (Effective) 137 101 146 119 132 101
BW ±10.195 ±6.968 ±10.892 ±8.413 ±9.76 ±6.942
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
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Table A5: RDD Continuity Check: Imputed Immigration History (Surname Score) and Vote
Choice, All Bills Pooled (House, Foreign Born Parents Determine Treatment Status)
40 45 50 55 60
Estimate -0.206 0.26 0.355∗ -0.155 0.117
(0.208) (0.182) (0.188) (0.336) (0.342)
N 252 252 252 252 252
N (Effective) 95 111 113 75 54
BW ±7.536 ±7.66 ±8.641 ±6.785 ±7.16
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
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A.3.6 Immigration History by Parent/Grandparent
Unbundling immigrant history into the distinct backgrounds of specific family members high-
lights another aspect of immigrant background. In Table A7, we split out the foreign-born status
of each parent and grandparent separately. These results reveal a striking pattern: in the era we
study, paternal ancestry (coupled with surname) affects vote choice more than maternal ancestry.
The result appears most strikingly in Model 3, where the coefficient on foreign-born father’s fa-
ther is large, positive and with confidence intervals that do not overlap with zero. In comparison,
no other grandparent registers a coefficient statistically distinguishable from zero. When we in-
clude surname (presumably passed down from father’s father in almost all cases), the size of the
coefficient attenuates slightly but the size of the effect determined by the status of father’s father,
operating through surname and actual immigration history, have a magnitude significantly larger
than any other grandparent. As Model 2 illustrates, a similar pattern persists for father’s father,
where the combined effect of a foreign-born father and surname denoting foreign-born family his-
tory outweigh the effect of mother’s place of birth. All told, this suggests that fathers in particular
had a substantial effect on their child’s conception of immigrant identity, through passing down
surnames and by transmitting other aspects of identity. Notably, almost every MC in our sample
is male. While we cannot identify the effect of an MC’s gender on which parents’ background is
most important, in this period the immigration history of the father’s side of the family appears
to play a crucial role.
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Table A7: Immigration History by Parent/Grandparent and MC Vote Choice: All Bills Pooled
Pro Immigration Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign-Born Father 0.075∗∗ 0.049
(0.031) (0.033)
Foreign-Born Mother 0.081∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗
(0.031) (0.031)
Foreign-Born Father’s Father 0.096∗∗ 0.073
(0.044) (0.046)
Foreign-Born Father’s Mother −0.030 −0.038
(0.046) (0.047)
Foreign-Born Mother’s Father 0.004 0.009
(0.040) (0.041)
Foreign-Born Mother’s Mother 0.055 0.042
(0.041) (0.041)
Surname Parents Foreign Born 0.072∗∗∗
(0.024)
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born 0.030∗∗
(0.014)
log(CD Pop. Foreign) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Bill Dummy yes yes yes yes
Chamber Dummy yes yes yes yes
N 3,141 3,126 1,994 1,976
R2 0.445 0.445 0.456 0.455
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
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A.4 Additional Tables
Table A8: Summary Statistics for Key Variables, Sample of Voting MCs Matched to Census Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Median
Foreign Born MC 852 0.03 0.18 0
Parents Foreign Born 783 0.38 0.73 0.00
Grandparents Foreign Born 505 1.70 1.81 1.00
Immigration Index 505 0.76 0.94 0.25
At Least One Foreign Born Parent 783 0.23 0.42 0.00
At Least One Foreign Born Grandparent 534 0.55 0.50 1.00
All Foreign Born Parents 783 0.15 0.36 0.00
All Foreign Born Grandparents 505 0.34 0.47 0.00
Surname Foreign Born MC 847 0.09 0.12 0.06
Surname Parents Foreign Born 847 0.48 0.46 0.35
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born 845 1.23 1.10 0.97
Democrat 852 0.45 0.50 0
Republican 852 0.55 0.50 1
Other Party 852 0.005 0.07 0
House 852 0.68 0.47 1
Nonwhite 769 0.00 0.00 0.00
Northeast 852 0.27 0.45 0
Midwest 852 0.30 0.46 0
West 852 0.16 0.37 0
South 852 0.27 0.45 0
CD Foreign Born Pop. 843 122,018.30 335,141.30 26,397.00
Age (Last Obs.) 852 56.24 10.84 56.5
Tenure (Last Obs.) 852 8.37 8.21 6
24
Table A9: Summary Statistics for Key Variables, Sample of MCs Matched to Census Data, 64th–
91st Congress
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Median
Foreign Born MC 2,915 0.04 0.19 0.00
Parents Foreign Born 2,660 0.42 0.76 0.00
Grandparents Foreign Born 1,569 1.87 1.83 2.00
Immigration Index 1,569 0.87 0.98 0.50
At Least One Foreign Born Parent 2,661 0.26 0.44 0.00
At Least One Foreign Born Grandparent 1,694 0.60 0.49 1.00
All Foreign Born Parents 2,660 0.17 0.37 0.00
All Foreign Born Grandparents 1,569 0.38 0.49 0.00
Surname Foreign Born MC 2,909 0.09 0.11 0.06
Surname Parents Foreign Born 2,909 0.47 0.45 0.35
Surname Grandparents Foreign Born 2,906 1.23 1.10 0.98
Democrat 2,916 0.52 0.50 1
Republican 2,916 0.47 0.50 0
Other Party 2,916 0.01 0.10 0
House 2,916 0.82 0.38 1
Nonwhite 2,596 0.003 0.06 0.00
Northeast 2,916 0.28 0.45 0
Midwest 2,916 0.32 0.47 0
West 2,916 0.12 0.33 0
South 2,916 0.28 0.45 0
CD Foreign Born Pop. 2,813 98,982.31 294,168.90 24,631.83
Age (Last Obs.) 2,915 55.95 11.31 56.00
Tenure (Last Obs.) 2,916 9.39 7.67 6
25
Table A10: District Composition and MC Immigration History, 64th – 91st Congresses (House
Only)
MC
Foreign Born
Parents
Foreign Born
Grandparents
Foreign Born
Immigration
Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(CD Pop. Foreign) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.012) (0.034) (0.017)
log(CD Pop. Urban) −0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.005
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
Northeast −0.016∗ 0.073∗ 0.059 0.069
(0.009) (0.041) (0.099) (0.052)
South −0.014∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ −0.903∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.036) (0.112) (0.053)
West −0.030∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.358∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.046) (0.138) (0.066)
Congress FE yes yes yes yes
N 12,075 11,046 7,444 7,444
R2 0.024 0.131 0.296 0.276
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at district level by redistricting cycle.
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Table A11: Immigration History and Immigration Phrases (No Covariates)
Immigration Phrases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MC Foreign Born 0.198
(0.135)
Parents Foreign Born 0.091∗∗∗
(0.024)
Grandparents Foreign Born 0.055∗∗∗
(0.011)
Immigration Index 0.113∗∗∗
(0.025)
Congress FE yes yes yes yes
Chamber FE yes yes yes yes
N 14,760 13,646 8,959 8,959
R2 0.171 0.177 0.209 0.210
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
27
Table A12: Immigration History and Immigration Phrases (with Covariates)
Immigration Phrases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MC Foreign Born 0.071
(0.128)
Parents Foreign Born 0.052∗∗
(0.024)
Grandparents Foreign Born 0.031∗∗
(0.012)
Immigration Index 0.070∗∗∗
(0.027)
log(CD Pop. Foreign) 0.066∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Republican −0.049 −0.052 −0.027 −0.026
(0.033) (0.035) (0.042) (0.041)
Other Party 0.093 0.074 0.101 0.088
(0.128) (0.126) (0.150) (0.149)
Northeast −0.064∗ −0.073∗ −0.071 −0.075
(0.039) (0.040) (0.052) (0.052)
South −0.037 −0.035 −0.072 −0.077
(0.044) (0.045) (0.055) (0.055)
West 0.069 0.041 −0.003 −0.002
(0.047) (0.047) (0.057) (0.057)
Age 0.017∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.003 0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Age Sq. −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Tenure 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Tenure Sq. −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Congress FE yes yes yes yes
Chamber FE yes yes yes yes
N 14,282 13,188 8,651 8,651
R2 0.208 0.209 0.237 0.237
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
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Table A13: Immigration History and Family & Immigration Speeches (No Covariates)
Family & Immigration Speeches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MC Foreign Born 0.064
(0.049)
Parents Foreign Born 0.024∗∗∗
(0.007)
Grandparents Foreign Born 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
Immigration Index 0.026∗∗∗
(0.008)
Congress FE yes yes yes yes
Chamber FE yes yes yes yes
N 14,760 13,646 8,959 8,959
R2 0.052 0.054 0.067 0.068
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
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Table A14: Immigration History and Family & Immigration Speeches (with Covariates)
Family & Immigration Speeches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MC Foreign Born 0.035
(0.047)
Parents Foreign Born 0.013∗∗
(0.007)
Grandparents Foreign Born 0.007∗∗
(0.003)
Immigration Index 0.016∗∗
(0.008)
log(CD Pop. Foreign) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Republican −0.037∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.029∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Other Party −0.007 −0.009 −0.015 −0.018
(0.037) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043)
Northeast 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.015
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
South −0.013 −0.014 −0.018 −0.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
West 0.004 −0.0002 −0.015 −0.015
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Age 0.002 0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Age Sq. −0.00003 −0.00002 0.00001 0.00001
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Tenure 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure Sq. −0.0001∗∗ −0.0001∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005)
Congress FE yes yes yes yes
Chamber FE yes yes yes yes
N 14,282 13,188 8,651 8,651
R2 0.062 0.061 0.074 0.074
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
SEs clustered at MC level.
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